Developing World Bioethics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 211-226, December 2021.

Clarke and Beck rightly contend that the number sense allows us to directly perceive number. However, they unnecessarily assume a representationalist approach and incur a heavy theoretical cost by invoking “modes of presentation.” We suggest that the relevant evidence is better explained by adopting a radical enactivist approach that avoids characterizing the approximate number system as a system for representing number.

This material originally appeared as part of a larger publication developed by ERIC, unden a contract with the National Institute of Edu cation, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as a practical resource for teaching about science-related social issues. It was pub lished jointly by ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/social Science Education and the Sociat Science Education Consortium.

In recent decades the relationship between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy has been a focal point for debate about the distinctiveness of analysis as a particular kind of therapeutic enterprise. In _Interpretation and Interaction_, Jerome Oremland invokes the interventions of "interpretation" and "interaction," rooted in the values of understanding and amelioration, respectively, as a conceptual basis for reappraising these important issues. In place of the commonly accepted triadic division among psychoanalysis, exploratory psychotherapy, and supportive psychotherapy, he proposes a new triad: psychoanalysis, psychoanalytically-oriented (...) psychotherapy, and interactive psychotherapy. Anchoring his classification in what he terms the "orientation of the therapy" rather than the "orientation of the therapist," Oremland submits that analysis and psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapy strive systematically to _interpret_ the therapeutic interaction as expressed in the transference. Interactive psychotherapy, on the other hand, uses the transference selectively to ameliorate psychic stress. _Interpretation and Interaction_ is enriched by a concluding chapter from Merton Gill, a preeminent authority on the therapeutic process. Gill's critical appreciation of Oremland's proposals amounts to an illuminating refinement of his own position on the relationship between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Scholarly in conception, thoughtful in tone, and pragmatic in yield, _Interpretation and Interaction_ is a clarifying addition to the psychoanalytic theory of psychotherapy. It will have the practical consequence, in Gill's words, of "aiding clinicians in retaining their analytic identities and their analytic orientation across the spectrum of their therapeutic work.". (shrink)

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des (...) Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

Concepts d'espace est un classique de la philosophie et de l'histoire des sciences. Enrichi d'une celebre preface d'Albert Einstein, l'ouvrage de Max Jammer couvre pres de vingt-cinq siecles d'elaboration du concept d'espace physique. L'auteur allie la methode historique a la methode philosophique dans l'analyse des differentes traditions scientifique et philosophique, et c'est la l'originalite de ce travail dont la coherence tient a l'unite d'une question sans cesse remise sur le metier: le probleme de l'espace dans la theorie physique. Depuis sa (...) premiere parution en 1954, l'ouvrage a ete considerablement augmente, d'abord en 1969 par l'allongement du cinquieme chapitre consacre au concept d'espace dans la science moderne, puis en 1993, par l'ajout d'un sixieme et dernier chapitre visant a apprecier les avancees theoriques nouvelles. L'edition francaise comporte une postface originale de Marc Lachieze-Rey qui prolonge et renouvelle l'analyse de Max Jammer par une presentation de certains developpements actuels en physique. (shrink)

... writing to the Princess Dashkofï in, thus analysee! the spirit of his century: Chaque siècle a son esprit qui le caractérise. L'esprit du nôtre semble ...

À l'encontre de la conception classique qui fait de l'idée d'infini l'expression de la perfection de Dieu inscrite en l'homme, Diderot propose une conception de l'infini qui rapporte immédiatement celui-ci à sa production corporelle. Soustrayant ainsi l'infini au divin, la pensée du corps sensible révoque jusqu'en ses fondements la conceptualité classique qui, par la notion d'ordre, liait l'épistémologie au théologique. Le désordre s'en trouve réévalué jusqu'en ses formes pathologiques et gagne ainsi une valeur créatrice immanente et fondamentale.

The article discusses a key issue for Russian and international Max Weber Studies: the epistemological possibilities and place of Weberian sociology in modern social theory. Discussion articles by well-known Russian scientists — who sharply criticized the actualizing direction of Weberian studies in general, and the religious, cultural, and sociological orientation in particular — are contrasted with the re-actualization and rethinking of key Weberian themes in the “New Critical Theory” of the influential German sociologist Hartmut Rosa. Such a projection will make (...) it possible, on the one hand, to thematize the axiomatic assertion about the heuristic rather than concrete-content relevance of the classics; on the other hand, it will provide an opportunity to read Weber as a macrosociologist. In the original, criticized, and often rejected sociology of Rosa, Weber appears not only as a predecessor whose mention enhances the relevance of the new theoretical framework, but, above all, as an analyst and diagnostician of early modernity. Weber’s main ideas and theoretical constructions are organically built into Rosa’s methodological framework: analysis-diagnosis-praxis. The analysis of rationalization as a universal historical process of modernity in Weber’s sociology is rethought by Rosa as expansion and acceleration; disenchantment becomes a diagnosis of modernity and is recoded into alienation, while the concept of charisma is transformed into the key concept of resonance. (shrink)

Theory in the traditional sense of the word comprises a deductive system in which hypotheses and their logical consequences are compared with empirical observations. Such comparison is usually regarded as a verification of the theory. The ideal for this conception of theory is a universal scientific system in which the theories of the different scientific disciplines are brought together under the head of a few fundamental principles.Traditional theory and reality belong to two distinct and separate provinces. Insofar as men make (...) forecasts with the help of theory and attempt to change reality, they do not act as theoreticians. Theory remains in the realm of contemplation. Philosophers have frequently made something absolute out of this aspect of theory and, under the title of,logosf or.spirit', have deified the subject of these intellectual activities. It appears in their systems as the creator of the world. What they are really doing, however, is treating the scholar’s activity, which is based on the division of labor in modern society, as an dbjective and independent substance. The real subject of theory in its traditional aspect is not pure spirit but the scholar who performs definite and necessary functions in modem society.If such an analysis is accepted, the philosophical naiveté of the theoretician disappears. He perceives that not only thinking as such, but also its task, its direction, and the structure of the objective world are ultimately connected with human activity and work. Out of the historical process by which men wrest their living from nature, there emerges the separation of material and intellectual work, as well as the structure and the content of the latter. The dogmatic differentiation between the logical and historical premises of science cannot be maintained. The theoretician is himself part and parcel of the subject which forms the real objective world. To take an active part in the direction of the social life of humanity, therefore, becomes a function and a requirement of science.So it is as theory, in the critical sense of the word, that the author regards the type of reasoning which attempts to impart to social life in its totality a rational form and which does not limit itself to working within the framework of the given system of the division of labor. The history of different scientific theories shows theory, with its unity and clarity, in contrast and opposition to the heterogeneity and disharmony of the real world. In the attempts to achieve harmony in society, thought may play an important role.The author analyses the logical structure of critical theory in the performance of such a function. Its content is the description of present society in terms of a development towards a rational form. Critical theory, therefore, always remains intimately linked up with the reality of existence. It needs for its development in each and every instance the existence and assistance of the various scientific disciplines. Its logical structure, however, is more complicated than that of theory in the traditional sense, because it does not regard its objectives as a separate and foreign province. Science, in the traditional sense, even where it formulates developments in nature and human history, regards interests and purposes as given facts and guideposts that are foreign to its own structure. It has a utilitarian character in a directly understandable sense. Critical theory, however, is confronted with the task of justifying its own problems and their differentiation and has to adjust its internal structure accordingly. It does not set up an unchanging system but sees as its purpose the attempt to apply the knowledge that has been accumulated in the traditional theories to the social totality in the direction that critical theory itself indicates.La théorie, au sens traditionnel, est un système déductif. La confrontation des connaissances obtenues par voie déductive avec les faits constatés permet la vérification de la théorie. L'idéal est un système universel de la science dans lequel les théories des différentes disciplines, toutes ensemble, sont rattachées à un petit nombre de propositions premières.La réalité demeure extérieure à une théorie ainsi conçue. Dans la mesure où les hommes utilisent la théorie pour faire des prévisions et pour modifier la réalité, ils ne sont plus des théoriciens. En ce sens, la théorie est purement contemplative. Les philosophes qui ont analysé la connaissance ont souvent porté à l'absolu cet aspect de la théorie et ont fait du sujet des opérations intellectuelles, sous les noms de,Logos4 ou de,Esprit4, le démiurge du monde. En vérité, ils ont ainsi hypostasié l'activité, qui dans la société moderne revient au savant du fait de la division du travail. Le sujet réel de la théorie sous sa forme traditionnelle, loin d'être l'esprit pur, est le savant qui remplit dans la société bourgeoise une fonction nécessaire, bien déterminée.Après cette prise de conscience, la naïveté philosophique du théoricien doit disparaître. Il comprend que la pensée, ses tâches et son orientation, l'organisation du monde qui lui est donné, se ramènent en dernière analyse au travail humain. Le combat de l'homme avec la nature est la condition de l’évolution historique, dans laquelle le travail matériel se sépare du travail intellectuel, il détermine la structure et le contenu de ce dernier. La séparation rigide des hypothèses logiques et historiques de la science est impossible à maintenir. L'activité du théoricien exprime le sujet concret qui ne donne pas forme à la seule théorie, mais aussi au monde réel. Prendre position dans la vie sociale, l'influencer consciemment devient une tâche immanente à la science.Par théorie au sens critique, H. entend la connaissance qui ne se contente pas de construire ses systèmes en respectant les cadres de la division du travail existante, mais qui s'efforce de donner à la totalité sociale une forme raisonnable. Dans l'histoire, la cohérence logique et comme transparente qui caractérise les théories traditionnelles, était en contradiction avec les rapports réels. Dans les tentatives pour rendre la société conforme à l'harmonie de la pensée, celle-ci peut jouer un rôle important.H. étudie la structure logique que présente la pensée lorsqu'elle exerce une telle fonction. Elle a pour contenu la représentation de la société actuelle, envisagée par rapport à révolution vers la raison. La théorie critique forme par conséquent un jugement existentiel unique. Pour développer et justifier celui-ci, elle a besoin, à chaque instant, de la science spéciale. Mais comme la théorie ne conçoit pas les buts qu'elle s'assigne comme extérieurs à elle, elle est logiquement plus compliquée que la théorie traditionnelle. Même lorsque la discipline spéciale construit des évolutions comme dans l'histoire naturelle et humaine, elle est orientée par des objectifs et des intérêts. Elle est, en un sens immédiatement compréhensible, utile. La théorie critique, au contraire, doit justifier elle-même la manière dont elle pose les problèmes, qui d'ailleurs sans cesse se transforment, elle doit modifier en conséquence l'ordre de son développement. Elle ne travaille pas en vue d'un système fixe, mais se comprend elle-même comme une tentative pour appliquer le savoir accumulé par les théories traditionnelles, à la marche historique de l'ensemble social, afin d'exercer une action dans un sens bien déterminé.Aussi bien, cette fonction de la théorie est-elle la réalisation des intentions authentiques de la philosophie idéaliste classique. (shrink)

En este artículo se quiere trazar una teoría política de la insurrección en el pensamiento de Max Stirner, en tanto alternativa ética y política a la revolución. Se mostrará cómo, según el pensador alemán, la revolución es en última instancia una estrategia fallida de emancipación en tanto en cuanto no libera al individuo de las formas de subjetividad que lo mantienen dependiente del poder. Más en general, se enseñará como el orden liberal post-revolucionario, detrás del lenguaje secular de los derechos, (...) las libertades y la igualdad, engendra técnicas más sutiles de gobernabilidad del individuo. La insurrección, en cambio, puede ser vista como un rechazo de las identidades y de los roles que disciplinan al individuo. Al respecto, se prestará una atención especial al concepto stirneriano de Eigenheit, como estrategia ética de auto-determinación y liberación de las formas rígidas de la subjetividad. En última instancia, se querrá mostrar cómo todo el proyecto político de la insurrección stirneriana se basa en un anarquismo ontológico que rechaza la lógica teleocrática del racionalismo moderno y pone en entredicho la misma noción de realización. The aim of this article to outline a political theory of insurrection in Max Stirner’s thought as an ethical and political alternative to revolution. I will show that revolution is ultimately a failed strategy of emancipation as it does not free the individual from the forms of subjectivity that keep her dependent on power. Insurrection, on the other hand, can be seen as a rejection of the identities and roles that discipline the individual. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the Stirnerian concept of Eigenheit as an ethical strategy of self-determination and liberation from rigid forms of subjectivity. Ultimately, I will show how the whole political project of the Stirnerian insurrection is based on an ontological anarchism that rejects the teleocratic logic of modern rationalism and calls into question the very notion of realization. (shrink)

The article deals with the relationship between science and religion (esp. Christian faith) in two articles of physicists Max Planck and Pascual Jordan. The relationship of the two factors is reflected in the treatment of time, a subject that comes up because both articles were written on the occasion of the year's end or even the end of a decade. By analysing the two perspectives on time it is possible to distil the distinctive ideas of Planck and Jordan on religion (...) and how a religious should be related to a scientific world view. From this two different models of a positive relationship of science and religion can be formulated which transcend the framework of present discussions on the subject. In conclusion a possible role of science of religions in the dialogue between science and religion is described. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the "heterophenomenology" developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of "critical phenomenology" implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a paper (...) posted on Dan's website that summarises a related debate between Dan, David Chalmers and Alvin Goldman (Dennett, 2001). To make the discussion easier to follow, the multiple embeddings have been removed (restoring the sequence in which the comments were written). I have also corrected a few typos and grammatical errors. However, the text of the emails remains exactly the same. In Round 1, I suggest that scientific investigations of consciousness are better described as a form of "critical phenomenology" that accepts conscious experiences to be real rather than as a "heterophenomenology" which remains neutral about or denies their existence. Dan replies that I have misunderstood his position - he doesn't deny that conscious experiences exist. Conscious experiences just don't have the first-person phenomenal properties that they are commonly thought to have and, in his view, science remains neutral about the nature of such properties. In Round 2, I agree with Dan that science initially remains neutral about how to understand the nature of conscious experiences. Nevertheless, the phenomenology of consciousness provides the data that scientists are trying to understand. A better understanding of data does not, in general, make the data disappear. I also ask, "if you remove the phenomena from phenomenal consciousness, in what sense is whatever remains "consciousness"? And, if one removes all the phenomenal content from what one takes consciousness to be, doesn't this amount to a denial of the existence of "consciousness" in any ordinary sense of this term? Dan's reply likens beliefs in phenomenal properties to the belief in evil spirits causing disease. He has no doubts that diseases such as whooping cough and tuberculosis are real, but this doesn't require him to believe in evil spirits. And, what's left, once one removes phenomenal properties, is what a zombie and a so-called conscious person have in common: a given set of functional properties that enable them to carry out the tasks we normally think of as conscious. In Round 3, I summarise our similarities and differences. We agree that first-person reports are not incorrigible and that third-person information may throw light on how to interpret them. We also agree that first-person reports are reports of "something", although we disagree about the nature of that something. I suggest that Dan is sceptical about first-person reports rather than heterophenomenologically "neutral" (e.g. when he likens belief in phenomenal properties to belief in evil spirits). While we agree that science is likely to deepen our understanding of consciousness, I repeat that, unlike the replacement of old theories by better theories, a deeper understanding of phenomena does not in general replace the phenomena themselves. Rather than third-person data replacing first-person reports, the former are required to make sense of the latter, making their relationship complementary and mutually irreducible. In fact, there are many cases where science takes the reality of first-person phenomenology seriously, for example in the extensive literature on pain and its alleviation. If this can't be squeezed into an exclusively third-person view of science, then we will just have to adjust our view of science - something that a "critical phenomenology" achieves at little cost. At the time of this editing, Dan has not replied. . Reference. Dennett, D. (2001) The fantasy of first-person science. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/pubpage.htm. (shrink)

Over the past century or more, cognitive neuropsychologists have discussed many of the issues raised in this volume. On the basis of this literature, we argue that autism is not a single homogeneous condition, and so can have no single cause. Instead, each of its symptoms has a cause, and the proper study of autism is the separate study of each of these symptoms and its cause. We also offer evidence to support the radical view advanced by Stoljar and Gold (...) in this volume, namely, that in explaining such syndromes the cognitive level of explanation has priority over the neuroscientific. (shrink)

Penseur et philosophe, Max Planck a dominé par sa personnalité toute la science moderne. Pour Albert Einstein, il a " doté le monde d'une grande idée créatrice " dont la découverte deviendrait " la base de toute la recherche en physique au XXe siècle ". C'est dans le domaine de la thermodynamique que fit irruption sa découverte révolutionnaire, en 1900, alors qu'il s'intéressait au rayonnement émis par les corps qu'on échauffe et aux propriétés de la matière avec laquelle ce rayonnement (...) interagit: contrairement à ce que supposait la physique classique, les échanges d'énergie entre le rayonnement et la matière ne peuvent se faire que par paquets discontinus, les quanta. Une hypothèse de quantification vis-à-vis de laquelle Planck lui-même exprima la plus extrême réticence mais qui signa l'acte de naissance de la physique quantique. Au terme de sa vie, à l'âge de quatre-vingt-sept ans, l'illustre savant revient une dernière fois sur son oeuvre et nous livre la démarche même de son esprit au travail. Un témoignage inestimable, suivi de quatre grandes conférences, qui furent aussi ses derniers écrits : " Les faux problèmes de la science ", " La signification et les limites de la science ", " Le concept de la causalité en physique " et, tel un testament spirituel, " Science et religion ". (shrink)

La philosophie des sciences de l'empirisme logique avait discredite la causalite comme etant un concept du sens commun irremediablement vague et confus, pour lui substituer le concept d'explication scientifique. Cependant, dans nombre de theories contemporaines, notamment en philosophie de l'esprit et du langage, le concept de causalite continue a jouer un role de premier plan. Ce livre montre qu'il est possible de concevoir la causalite d'une maniere compatible avec des connaissances scientifiques contemporaines. La relation causale fondamentale a lieu entre evenements (...) en fonction de la transmission d'une quantite determinee d'une grandeur conservee; mais ce qui rend vraie une explication causale, ce n'est pas seulement une relation causale entre deux evenements, mais une relation de responsabilite causale. Le concept de loi de la nature qui intervient dans cette analyse s'avere fructueux non seulement dans le cadre de la causalite, mais aussi pour l'eclairage qu'il permet d'apporter a la philosophie des sciences. (shrink)

Une invitation, reçue au début de l’automne 2011, à intervenir dans la séance du 7 mars 2012 d’un séminaire tenu à l’EHESS sur l’islamophobie, a été l’occasion de traiter de « l’affaire Gouguenheim » plus de trois ans après son irruption dans la sphère médiatique. Cette nouvelle lecture d’Aristote au Mont Saint-Michel a permis de mettre en évidence l’importance que Sylvain Gouguenheim attribue à un texte du haut Moyen Age pour suivre la diffusion de l’hellénisme dans l’Europe latine. Il s’agit (...) d’une lettre adressée par le pape Paul 1er à Pépin le Bref. Ce document, le plus souvent négligé par les latinistes en raison de ses obscurités, a excité la sagacité des hellénistes, qui ont très majoritairement montré la difficulté d’en tirer des informations positives. La situation est singulière, si l’on se souvient que, pour l’essentiel, ce sont des latinistes et des arabisants qui ont mené la charge contre les impostures gouguenheimiennes. À la faveur de ce cas d’espèce, « l’affaire Gouguenheim » jette une lumière crue sur la place dérisoire que, pour des raisons historiques, l’enseignement supérieur accorde en France à la philosophie médiévale. Le scandale repose, certes, sur les manipulations d’un agrégé d’histoire ; mais il dévoile aussi l’une des lacunes de l’institution universitaire hexagonale dans l’enseignement de la philosophie médiévale. (shrink)

The book examines the extent to which Chinese cyber and network security laws and policies act as a constraint on the emergence of Chinese entrepreneurialism and innovation. Specifically, how the contradictions and tensions between data localisation laws affect innovation in artificial intelligence. The book surveys the globalised R&D networks, and how the increasing use of open-source platforms by leading Chinese AI firms during 2017–2020, exacerbated the apparent contradiction between Network Sovereignty and Chinese innovation. The drafting of the Cyber Security Law (...) did not anticipate the changing nature of globalised AI innovation. It is argued that the deliberate deployment of what the book refers to as 'fuzzy logic' in drafting the Cyber Security Law allowed regulators to subsequently interpret key terms regarding data in that Law in a fluid and flexible fashion to benefit Chinese innovation. (shrink)